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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a : 
body corporate and politic, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, : 
Case No. 14190 
vs . : 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, : 
Defendant- : 
Respondent, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, University of Utah, appeals the order granting 
summary judgment on behalf of Salt Lake County against the plain-
tiff-appellant University of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court of the Third Judicial District, the Hon-
orable Stewart M. Hanson, J r . , Judge, granted the motion for 
summary judgment brought by defendant Salt Lake County. The 
summary judgment was that the plaint iff-appellant University of 
Utah had no cause of action against the defendant-respondent Salt 
Lake County. Judge Hanson ruled as a matter of law that the prop-
erty subject to the litigation was subject to property taxes by Salt 
Lake County. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this court reversing the judg-
ment of the Third District Court in this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaint iff-appellant is a body corporate and politic organ-
ized under the laws of the state of Utah. On October 28, 1970 |the 
University of Utah entered into a lease-purchase agreement with 
Picker X-Ray, one of the defendants below. (Plaintiff's complaint-
Exhibit A. ) On December 17, 1970 and October 19, 1971 addehda 
to the agreement of October 28, 1972 were made and entered into 
between the University of Utah and Picker X-Ray (Exhibits B and C 
of plaintiff1 s complaint, respectively). That the equipment was de-
livered by Picker X-Ray to the University of Utah, installed ax the 
University of Utah Hospital, and used in conjunction with the exempt 
purposes of the University of Utah College of Medicine and Hojspital 
is not in dispute. 
Salt Lake County invoiced Picker X-Ray for personal prop-
erty taxes on the equipment subject to the lease for 1972 in th 
amount of $5, 391. 97, 1973 in the amount of $4, 745. 32, and 1^74 
in the amount of $2,798.87; for an aggregate of $12, 936.16. 
(Counterclaim of Picker X-Ray, paragraph 9.) The assessments 
for 1972 and subsequent years were paid by Picker X-Ray and the 
amount of the assessments was billed to the University of Ut^h by 
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Picker X-Ray (Counterclaim of Picker X-Ray, paragraph 12.) 
According to the addendum dated December 17, 1970 
(plaintiffs complaint, Exhibit B), the University of Utah had 
the opportunity at the termination of the five-year lease period 
to either continue leasing the equipment at the cost of $30, 864. 96 
per year or to purchase the equipment at the cost of $38, 581. 20. 
It has always been the intent of the University of Utah to purchase 
the equipment and to use the lease-purchase arrangement as a 
form of financing arrangement necessitated by budgetary con-
siderations. (Affidavit of Raymond E# Bowden.) 
According to paragraph 5 of the lease agreement dated Oc-
tober 28, 1970, the University of Utah is obligated to pay all taxes, 
assessment and governmental charges levied or assessed on the 
equipment except for taxes based on the net income of the lessor . 
According to the lease-purchase agreement and the addenda 
the University obtained physicial control and custody of the equip-
ment, the obligation to insure and protect the equipment against 
loss, the sole obligation to maintain and repair the equipment, the 
obligation to bear the liability of prospective, consequential or spe-
cial damages, economic loss or damage resulting from loss of use 
of the equipment, the right to have the day-to-day control over the 
nature and extent and use of the equipment, the obligation to bear 
all responsibility arising out of the use of the equipment , to use 
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the equipment as many hours of the day or week as the lessee 
in its sole discretion shall determine, and in general to have 
all of the indicia of ownership not inconsistent with the security 
interests of the sel ler , Picker X-Ray. The addendum of De-
cember .17, 1970 (Exhibit B, Plaintiffs Complaint) specifically 
provides that through the lease purchase contract no general 
obligation is created against the State of Utah and in the event 
funding is not sufficient to complete the purchase, the State 
of Utah and the University of Utah a re absolved from further 
liability and the lessor will remove the equipment from the 
premises of the University of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROPERTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH IS 
EXEMPT FROM TAXATION PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES. 
Article 13, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution provides 
for the exemption from tax of personal property under certaija 
conditions. This section states in part: 
. . . The property of the state, 
counties, cities, towns, school dis t r ic ts , 
municipal corporations and public l ibra-
r i e s , lots-with the buildings thereon used 
exclusively for either religious worship 
or charitable purposes, . . . shall be 
exempt from taxation . . . 
The Utah Code Ann. Section 59-2-30 clarifies the scope 
of exemption of Section 2 of Article XIII of the Utah State Consti-
- 4 -
tution. The requirements for exemption under this section a re 
as follows: 
(1) The user is not organized to pro-
duce a profit from the use of the property. 
(2) No part of any net earnings, from 
the use of the property, inures to the benefit 
of any private shareholder or individual, but 
any net earnings shall be used directly or in-
directly, for the charitable or religious pur-
poses of the organization. 
(3) The property is not used or oper-
ated by the organization or other person so as 
to benefit any officer, t rustee, director, share -
holder, lessor , member, employee, contribu-
tor, or any other person through the distribu-
tion of profits, payment of excessive charges 
or compensations. 
(4) Upon the liquidiation, dissolution, 
or abandonment of the user no part of any pro-
ceeds derived from such use will inure to the 
benefit of any private person. 
Fur thermore, Utah Code Annotated 53-48-18 makes per -
fectly clear the status of state institutions of higher education with 
respect to Article XIII, Section 2 of the Constitution: 
The property of the institutions gov-
erned by the board shall be exempt from all 
taxes and assessments . 
Clearly, the appellant University of Utah is a sub-division 
or institution of the State of Utah within the meaning of Article XIII, 
Section 2 of the Constitution and the property of the University is 
exempt from taxation by virtue of this section and Utah Code Ann. 
Sections 59-48-18 and 59-2-3. Just as clearly, the equipment in 
question has been used in furtherance of the exempt purposes of 
the University of Utah. This fact has not been disputed at any 
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point by the respondent, Salt Lake County/ 
POINT II 
THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE LEASE-PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT AND ADDENDA IS THE "PROPERTY OFff THE 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTA] 
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES. 
According to the lease of October 28,, 1970 and the ad-
denda thereto, the University acquired free and unfettered usd 
of the equipment which was the subject of the lease . The only 
restr ic t ions placed on the University1 s use of the equipment were 
that lease payments had to be made., the equipment had to be used 
in carrying out the purposes of the University Hospital and College 
of Medicine, and other nominal restr ict ions of the lease. Fur ther -
more , the University of Utah acquired the right to purchase the 
equipment at the termination of the lease period for the amount of 
$38,581.20. 
To qualify for exemption, the property in question mufet be 
the nproperty oft! the exempt organization, in this case the S t p e of 
Utah and the University of Utah. There appear to be various Icon-
structions that can be given to the statutory words "property of". 
In arriving at the appropriate construction, it is necessary to r e -
view the legislative intent and rules of construction generallyf ap-
plicable to tax exemptions. 
F rom the language of Article XIII Section 2 it is cleaif that 
-
V
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the Legislature in proposing the language of the section contem-
plated that the phrase nproperty ofn means something different 
than ownership. Why else would the language of other portions 
of this section refer specifically to ownership? 
Clearly, the legislative intent in providing for tax exemp-
tions for both private and public non-profit organizations is to 
foster and encourage the charitable activities of the various en-
ti t ies and organizations. It is a general rule of construction with 
non-governmental exempt organizations that exemption from tax-
ation is not favored and is to be strictly construed. (See for ex-
ample People ex reL Unity Congregational Society vs . Mills, 189 
Mis. 774, 71 NYS 2nd 873 (1947).) 
This general rule of construction does not apply however 
when the exemption is sought by a public entity such as a munici-
pality, the State, or an agency of the State such as the University 
of Utah in the instant case. The rule of construction with respect 
to publicly-owned property is clearly set forth in the case of Chey-
enne vs . Board of County Commissioners, 484 P . 2nd 706 (1971, 
Wyoming). In this case, the court discussed the rule of construc-
tion with respect to exemptions for publicly-held property and said 
the following: 
. . . where the established policy of 
the state is to exempt publicly-owned property 
the view that provisions of the constitution and 
statute must be strictly construed does not ap-
ply nor does the view apply . . . that taxation 
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is the rule and exemption must be presumed. 
The opposite is true . . . the burden is on 
the taxing authority to establish taxability. 
(484 P . 2nd at .708-9) 
In addition to the rule of construction set forth in the CJhey-
enne case, the over-riding interpretation to be given by the Supreme 
Court should be that which most accurately reflects the legislative 
intent. The clear and unequivocal legislative intent is to prohibit 
the taxing of one governmental entity by another and thus eliminate 
the resultant confusion and inequities. In light of the rules ofI inter-
pretation and the clear legislative intent the language "property of" 
should be interpreted as requiring the control of the exempt organ-
ization and not all of the indicia of legal t i t l e / 
Even in those jurisdictions where the statutory or constitu-
tional exemption of property requires that it be "owned by" the ex-
empt organization, the courts have consistently looked beyond the 
mere fact of technical legal title and have carefully examined1 the 
various indicia of ownership such as physical control, extent .of use, 
opportunity and likelihood of acquisition of absolute tit le, etc] Typi-
cal of these cases is Mitchell Aero, Inc. vs . Milwaukee, 42 Wis. 
2nd 656,168 Northwest 2nd 183 (1969). In this case the courtj eval-
uated whether or not privately constructed buildings on public land 
should be subject to taxation. In making its evaluation, the qourt 
likened ownership to a bundle of sticks or rights where one or more 
of the sticks may be separated from the bundle and the bundl^ would 
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still be considered as ownership. In this particular case, the court 
ignored the holding of legal title as being determinative of ownership 
and ruled instead that the substance of the transaction was that the 
party having the day-to-day physical control, use and benefit of the 
property was the owner for purposes of determining tax exemption. 
A further illustration of the predominant pattern of examin-
ing the substance of a transaction rather than its mere legal form 
is found in the case of Broadway & Fourth Avenue Realty Company 
vs . Louisville, 303 Kentucky 202, 197 S. W. 2nd 238 (1946). In 
this case, the court reviewed a long-term lease and held that the 
status of the lease holder, rather than the legal title holder, should 
be determinative of whether or not a tax exemption should be allowed. 
In the Broadway & Fourth Avenue Realty Company case, as in the in-
stant case, the pr imary indicia of ownership were in the lease holder 
with the only elements of ownership being retained by the lessor being 
the legal title and the security interest represented thereby. 
Because of its failure to examine the nbundle of sticks11 making 
up the ownership of the property subject to the lease purchase agree-
ment in the instant case, the District Court clearly committed e r ro r . 
This e r ror is compounded by the fact that the examination of the "bun-
dle of st icks" should have resulted in the ruling that as a matter of law 
the property subject to the agreement is the property of the University 
of Utah and should therefore be exempt from taxation. 
The basic considerations of the University of Utah in entering 
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the 
o 
into the lease-purchase agreement were clearly those of providing 
the greatest possible benefit to the State. Through this purchase 
arrangement a general obligation has not been created against 
State of Utah. Such an obligation may be in default if funding tc 
complete this transaction involving more than a quarter of a rail-
lion dollars of medical equipment is not forthcoming either frcrai 
the legislature, the Federal government or other sources . The 
protection afforded to the State through making a purchase in this 
form is to limit exposure to damages and liability beyond the value 
of the equipment if for some unforeseen reason the purchase can-
not be completed. Under a normal sales contract, which would 
clearly exempt the property from taxation, the vendor would be 
entitled to normal damages for breach of contract in the event 
funding for completion of the contract is not available. Now, for 
the benefit obtained for the State of Utah, Salt Lake County has 
attempted to exact its pound of flesh in the form of personal pr|< 
erty taxes . Irrespective of whether taxes a re reimbursed by 
University of Utah or the cost of equipment is increased to reflect 
taxes, the net result to the taxpayers of the State of Utah is the 
same. 
The lease purchase arrangement under which the property 
has been acquired is primari ly a security and financing a r range-
ment used, in the case of public entities, to facilitate purchases 
of significant pieces of equipment and limit exposure to liabililp 
-10-
op-
the 
To use the "bundle of sticks11 analogy, the only stick of any signi-
ficance retained by the vendor is the security interest in the equip-
ment itself. Surely, the respondent would not contest the tax ex-
emption of the property if the security were in the form specified 
by the Utah Uniform Commercial Code (Sections 70A-9-101etseq.) 
POINT III 
THE ERROR OF THE DISTRICT COURT WAS COMPOUNDED 
BY THE COURT'S FAILURE TO APPORTION THE TAX EXEMPTION 
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH TO THAT PORTION OF THE OWN-
ERSHIP OF THE EQUIPMENT HELD BY THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH. 
In some situations where the indicia of ownership a re split be-
tween an exempt organization and a non-exempt organization the courts, 
if the division of ownership results in substantial interests for both or -
ganizations, have determined that a portion of the value of the property 
is taxable and a portion is tax exempt. This does not appear to be the 
case in the instant situation, however, inasmuch as Picker X-Ray has 
retained what is virtually only a security interest and paper t i t le . 
The early case of Jetton v# University of the South, 208 U. S# 
489, 52L.Ed 584, 28 S.Ct. 375 (1908) held that the exemption from 
taxes could be apportioned according to the interest in the subject 
property held by the exempt organization. Even if the District Court 
was correct in not ruling as a matter of law that the property in ques-
tion was the property of the University of Utah, or in ruling that evi-
dence should be received to determine which indicia of ownership a r e 
- 1 1 -
held by the University of Utah and which by Picker X-Ray; theIcourt 
clearly erred in not attempting to apportion the tax exemption pf the 
University of Utah to that portion of the equipment owned by tlie Uni-
versity, if less than the entirety. 
The only portion of the equipment, if any, taxable by SapLt Lake 
County is the security interest of Picker X-Ray. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments of facts and law, Appel-
lant respectfully urges that the ruling of the District Court bej rever-
sed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
THOMAS C. ANDERSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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